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CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
The Honorable Jane Marum Roush *
I. INTRODUCTION
This article summarizes the major developments in Virginia
civil practice and procedure during the last two years. In particu-
lar, the decisions of the Supreme Court of Virginia from June
2007 through June 2009 are discussed, along with any significant
changes to the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia during
that same time period. Finally, the article addresses laws enacted
by the Virginia General Assembly in its 2008 and 2009 Sessions.
II. SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA DECISIONS
A. Public Access to Court Records
In two cases, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the pub-
lic's right of access to court records outweighs countervailing poli-
cy considerations of conflicting statutes.1
In the first case, Perreault v. Free Lance-Star, the Supreme
Court of Virginia held that the financial terms of a settlement of
a wrongful death case that was reached after mediation must be
made public over the objection of the parties, despite both the sta-
tute providing for confidentiality in mediation and the agreement
of the parties that the settlement would be confidential.2
* Judge, Nineteenth Judicial Circuit of Virginia. J.D., 1981, University of Virginia
School of Law; A.B., 1978, Wellesley College.
1. See Lotz v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 345, 351, 672 S.E.2d 833, 837 (2009) (holding
that the public has the right of access to mental health evaluations introduced into evi-
dence in a sexually violent predator hearing); Perreault v. Free Lance-Star, 276 Va. 375,
389, 666 S.E.2d 352, 359 (2008) (holding that the public has the right of access to court-
approved compromise settlements of wrongful death claims achieved through mediation).
2. Perreault, 277 Va. at 386-89, 666 S.E.2d at 358-59.
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In Perreault, four plaintiffs brought wrongful death suits
against a pharmaceutical manufacturer, alleging that their dece-
dents died as a result of improperly formulated or contaminated
drugs used to stop the heart during surgery.' After mediation, the
parties settled the cases.4 The settlement agreements provided
that the terms of the settlements, particularly the financial
terms, would be confidential.5 Under Virginia Code section 8.01-
55, any wrongful death settlement must be approved by the
court.6 Initially, the trial court entertained an oral motion to ap-
prove the settlements and, after a hearing from which the press
was barred, approved the settlements. 7 Several newspapers in-
tervened in the case, arguing that the plaintiffs should be re-
quired to file written petitions for approval of the settlements and
that any pleadings or orders in the case were public records un-
der Virginia Code section 17.1-208. 8 The trial court ultimately
ruled in favor of the newspapers and ordered the plaintiffs to file
written petitions for approval of the settlements that included the
financial terms of the settlements.9 The trial court ruled that the
petitions were public records subject to review by the press and
the public. 10
The supreme court affirmed, reasoning that Virginia Code sec-
tion 8.01-55 requires that wrongful death cases may only be com-
promised with the consent of the circuit court after a written peti-
tion that discloses the terms, including the financial terms, of the
settlement." Further, Virginia Code section 17.1-208 provides
that court records are public records.'2 Although Virginia Code
section 8.01-581.22 specifies that mediation is generally confiden-
tial, there are exceptions to the presumption of confidentiality,
including when disclosure is "provided by law or rule." 3 In this
3. Id. at 380 & n.2, 666 S.E.2d at 354 & n.2.
4. Id. at 380, 666 S.E.2d at 354.
5. Id. at 381, 666 S.E.2d at 354.
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-55 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2009).
7. Perreault, 276 Va. at 381, 666 S.E.2d at 354-55.
8. Id. at 381-82, 666 S.E.2d at 355. Section 17.1-208 of the Virginia Code states that
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, any records and papers of every circuit court shall
be open to inspection by any person .... " VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-208 (Cum. Supp. 2009).
9. Perreault, 276 Va. at 383, 666 S.E.2d at 356.
10. See id.
11. Id. at 385-86, 666 S.E.2d at 357-58.
12. Id. at 386-87, 666 S.E.2d at 358 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-208 (Cum. Supp.
2009)).
13. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.22(ix) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2009).
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case, the specific provisions of the wrongful death statute requir-
ing a petition that discloses the terms of the settlements "trump"
the more general provisions of the mediation statute providing for
confidentiality. 14 Finally, the supreme court ruled that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to redact the finan-
cial terms of the settlements from the court records. 1-
The second case that affirmed the primacy of the public's right
of access to court records is Lotz v. Commonwealth. 6 In that case,
the Supreme Court of Virginia signaled that its holding in Per-
reault was not limited to wrongful death cases.17 The court in Lotz
held that a mental health evaluation of a sexually violent preda-
tor prepared under Virginia Code section 37.2-910(B), although
assumed to be a health record, was nonetheless a public record
which should not be sealed without compelling reason. 8 The court
reasoned:
There is a rebuttable presumption of public access to judicial records
in civil proceedings. Exhibits entered into evidence in a judicial pro-
ceeding that lead to the judgment constitute judicial records. In or-
der to overcome the presumption of public access, the moving party
bears the burden of establishing an interest so compelling that it
cannot be protected reasonably by some measure other than a pro-
tective order. Further, risks of damage to professional reputation,
emotional damage, or financial harm, stated in the abstract, are not
sufficient reasons for a court to seal judicial records.19
Read together, Perreault and Lotz signal an end to the practice
of routinely sealing the record of a case when requested by coun-
sel. Neither the confidentiality of a mediated settlement in Per-
reault nor the confidentiality of medical records in Lotz was
deemed a sufficiently compelling reason to outweigh the public's
right of access to judicial records.
14. Perreault, 276 Va. at 389, 666 S.E.2d at 359.
15. Id. at 392, 666 S.E.2d at 361.
16. 277 Va. 345, 351, 672 S.E.2d 833, 837 (2009).
17. See id. at 351, 672 S.E.2d at 836-37.
18. Id. at 350-51, 672 S.E.2d at 836-37. Section 37.2-910(B) of the Virginia Code re-
quires that the Commissioner provide the court a report evaluating a sexually violent pre-
dator's condition and recommending treatment. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-910(B) (Cum. Supp.
2009).
19. Lotz, 277 Va. at 351, 672 S.E.2d at 836-37 (internal citations and quotations omit-
ted).
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B. Expert Witnesses
Perhaps one of the most important cases that the Supreme
Court of Virginia has decided in recent years in the area of expert
testimony is John Crane, Inc. v. Jones.2 In that wrongful death
case, the supreme court held that the trial court properly ex-
cluded testimony of two expert witnesses for the defense when
the substance of the experts' testimony had not been adequately
disclosed prior to trial.21
Jones was a shipyard worker who died as a result of his expo-
sure to asbestos. 22 His personal representative filed suit against
John Crane, Inc., a manufacturer of asbestos-containing products
sold to Jones's employer.2 The trial court excluded testimony of
two of Crane's expert witnesses because Crane had not disclosed
the substance of their testimony in pre-trial discovery. 24 A jury
awarded Jones $10.4 million in damages. 25
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's exclusion of the
expert testimony based on its interpretation of the requirements
of Rule 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i). 26 That Rule provides:
A party may through interrogatories require any other party to iden-
tify each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert
witness at trial, to state the subject matter on which the expert is
expected to testify, and to state the substance of the facts and opi-
nions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the
grounds for each opinion.
27
The trial judge had excluded two of Crane's expert witnesses from
offering opinions not disclosed in Crane's designation of expert
witnesses under Rule 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i).28 Crane argued that the ex-
cluded opinions of the first witness were "well known" to Jones's
estate because the estate had taken the expert's deposition. 2'9 Re-
20. 274 Va. 581, 650 S.E.2d 851 (2007).
21. Id. at 586, 592-93, 650 S.E.2d at 853, 856-57.
22. Id. at 585, 650 S.E.2d at 852.
23. Id. at 585-86, 650 S.E.2d at 852-53.
24. Id. at 591, 593, 650 S.E.2d at 856-57.
25. Id. at 586, 650 S.E.2d at 853.
26. Id. at 592, 593, 650 S.E.2d at 856-57.
27. VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i) (Repi. Vol. 2009).
28. Crane, 274 Va. at 591, 593, 650 S.E.2d at 856-57.
29. Id. at 592, 650 S.E.2d at 856.
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jecting that argument, the supreme court affirmed the exclusion
of the undisclosed opinions:
[A] party is not relieved from its disclosure obligation under the Rule
simply because the other party has some familiarity with the expert
witness or the opportunity to depose the expert. Such a rule would
impermissibly alter a party's burden to disclose and impose an af-
firmative burden on the non-disclosing party to ascertain the sub-
stance of the expert's testimony. We reject this reading of Rule
4: 1(b)(4)(A)(i). 30
The designation of a second expert referred to an attached report
for the substance of his opinions, but the report was not in fact
attached to the disclosure sent to the estate." Crane argued that
the estate was familiar with the second expert's opinions because
the estate's counsel had cross-examined the expert "at [other] tri-
al[s] about his reports going back to the '90s." 32 Crane also main-
tained "that the [e]state had failed to depose the [expert in this
case] or to ask Crane for representative samples of [the expert's]
testimony, either of which would have allowed the [e]state to as-
certain the actual substance of the testimony."3  Again, the su-
preme court affirmed the trial court's exclusion of the testimony:
Rule 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i) requires that the substance of opinions to be ren-
dered be disclosed. Here, while Crane did disclose the topic of [the
second expert's] testimony, Crane did not disclose the substance of
[the expert's] opinions in the disclosure or through [the expert's] re-
port. Crane thus failed to comply with the Rule and the trial court
did not err by excluding the testimony. As we stated when consider-
ing Crane's challenge to the trial court's ruling on the admissibility
of [the first expert's] testimony, an opponent's ability to depose an
expert or familiarity with such expert through prior litigation does
not relieve a party from complying with the disclosure requirements
of Rule 4: 1(b)(4)(A)(i).36
Following John Crane, Inc. v. Jones, when designating expert
testimony pursuant to Rule 4: 1(b)(A)(i), diligent trial counsel will
be very detailed in the disclosure of the specific opinions and facts
about which the expert will testify and the grounds for each of the
expert's opinions. The days of the bare-bones designation of the
30. Id.
31. Id. at 592-93, 650 S.E.2d at 857.
32. Id. at 593, 650 S.E.2d at 857.
33. Id.
34. Id. (citing VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i) (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
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general topics on which an expert will opine have ended in Vir-
ginia.
C. Election of Remedies
In an important case resolving a split among the circuit courts
of Virginia, the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled in Centra
Health, Inc. v. Mullins that a plaintiff must elect between a
wrongful death action and a survival action "only at a time when
the record sufficiently establishes that the personal injuries and
the death arose from the same cause."-5 In many cases, this may
occur only after both theories of recovery are submitted to a jury
and the jury settles the factual issue.36
In Centra Health, Mullins, age eighty-four, fell and broke his
hip.37 He was hospitalized and had surgery.35 After the surgery, he
was catheterized, developed a urinary tract infection, and died.3 9
The administrator of Mullins's estate sued the hospital, alleging
both a wrongful death and a survival action. 40 The hospital con-
tested any liability to the administrator. 41 Prior to trial, the hos-
pital moved that the administrator be compelled to elect between
the causes of action for wrongful death or survival. 42 There was no
dispute that wrongful death and survival are alternate, mutually
exclusive actions; the only dispute was when the plaintiff must
elect between the causes of action. 43 The hospital contended that
the election must be made prior to trial, lest the jury be preju-
diced by the evidence of damages in that there are different ele-
ments of damages for wrongful death and survival actions.44 The
administrator contended that, so long as the hospital was contest-
ing proximate causation, the administrator should be able to pro-
ceed on both causes and have the issue of proximate causation
35. 277 Va. 59, 79, 670 S.E.2d 708, 718 (2009). For additional discussion of the Centra
Health decision, see L. Steven Emmert, Election of Remedies: Centra Health v. Mullins, 44
U. RICH. L. REV. 149 (2009).
36. See Centra Health, 277 Va. at 79, 670 S.E.2d at 718.
37. Id. 277 at 64, 670 S.E.2d at 709.
38. Id.
39. Id., 670 S.E.2d at 709-10.
40. Id., 670 S.E.2d at 710.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 64-65, 670 S.E.2d at 710.
43. Id. at 65, 670 S.E.2d at 710.
44. Id. at 66, 670 S.E.2d at 711.
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submitted to the jury.45 The trial court denied the hospital's mo-
tion to compel and submitted both theories of recovery to the jury,
with careful instructions that the jury could only find for the
plaintiff under one of the causes of action. 46 The jury returned a
verdict in favor of the administrator on the survival action for
$325,000, and the hospital appealed. 47
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's order that af-
firmed the jury's verdict. 48 The court reasoned that the election of
remedies is required only at a time when the record sufficiently
establishes that the personal injuries and the death arise from
the same cause. 49 In this case, compelling an election prior to trial
"would put the administrators in the untenable, and manifestly
unjust, position of having to elect between two potentially viable
claims, which [the hospital] was contesting on separate and inde-
pendent grounds."10 The court suggested that avoiding jury preju-
dice or confusion on the issue of the evidence of damages can best
be handled by bifurcation:
Though there can be but one recovery in these cases, we are not un-
mindful of [the hospital's] contention that in permitting a plaintiff to
present evidence in support of a survival claim and a wrongful death
claim when the issue of causation is disputed, a defendant may be
subject to potential prejudice by the possibility that in a jury trial
the jury could conflate the differing elements of damages from each
claim in rendering a single verdict. We are of opinion, however, that
a defendant can obviate this potential for prejudice by requesting
that the trial be bifurcated into separate proceedings to determine
liability and damages. Indeed, in a case where there is any doubt as
to when compelling an election would be proper, bifurcation is the
most practical means to assure that each party receives a fair oppor-
tunity to present their case to the jury without prejudice to the oth-
er. 51
Although the trial in Centra Health was not bifurcated, the jury's
verdict was allowed to stand because the trial judge was "pains-
taking" in his efforts to instruct the jury on how damages should
45. Id.
46. Id. at 66, 69, 670 S.E.2d at 711, 713.
47. Id. at 71-72, 670 S.E.2d at 713-14.
48. Id. at 82, 670 S.E.2d at 720.
49. Id. at 79, 670 S.E.2d at 718.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 78, 670 S.E.2d at 718 (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wade, 265 Va. 383, 393, 579
S.E.2d 180, 185 (2003)).
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be assessed depending on whether the jury found for the admini-
strator on the wrongful death claim or the survival claim.52
D. Continuances
The Supreme Court of Virginia acknowledged in the case of
Haugen v. Shenandoah Valley Department of Social Services, that
it has applied widely varying legal standards when reviewing a
circuit court's decision to grant or deny a motion for a conti-
nuance.53 The supreme court took the opportunity to enunciate a
single standard to be applied "[t]oday and in the future."-
In Haugen, the Department of Social Services sought to termi-
nate the parental rights of Haugen and Pacheco.5 5 Both Haugen,
the mother, and Pacheco, the father, were incarcerated in federal
prisons after they were convicted of drug offenses.56 They partici-
pated in the hearing by telephone. 57 During the course of the
hearing, each parent, for various reasons, was forced to terminate
the telephone call.58 The trial court denied the motions of both
parents for a continuance and continued to hear evidence after
the parents were no longer participating in the hearing.59 The tri-
al court terminated Haugen's and Pacheco's parental rights. 0 On-
ly Haugen appealed.61
The supreme court reversed the decision to terminate the pa-
rental rights of Haugen, and announced a single standard for its
review of a ruling granting or denying a request for a conti-
nuance:
Today and in the future, when reviewing a circuit court's ruling to
grant or deny a continuance, this Court will apply the following
common law principles. ... The decision to grant a motion for a con-
tinuance is within the sound discretion of the circuit court and must
be considered in view of the circumstances unique to each case. The
circuit court's ruling on a motion for a continuance will be rejected
52. Id. at 81, 670 S.E.2d at 719-20.
53. 274 Va. 27, 33-34, 645 S.E.2d 261, 264-65 (2007).
54. Id. at 34, 645 S.E.2d at 265.
55. Id. at 29, 645 S.E.2d at 262.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 29-30, 645 S.E.2d at 262.
58. Id. at 30, 645 S.E.2d at 262-63.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 30, 645 S.E.2d at 263.
61. Id. at 30-31, 645 S.E.2d at 263.
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on appeal only upon a showing of abuse of discretion and resulting
prejudice to the movant .... [Wihen a circuit court's refusal to grant
a continuance "seriously imperil[s] the just determination of the
cause," the judgment must be reversed.62
Applying that standard, the supreme court held that the trial
court abused its discretion in not granting Haugen's request for a
continuance, particularly in light of the "'grave, drastic and irre-
versible' effects of terminating parental rights to a child.63
E. Extraordinary Writs
In the case of In re Commonwealth of Virginia, the Supreme
Court of Virginia reiterated that a writ of mandamus is indeed an
extraordinary writ that is appropriate in very limited circums-
tances.6 The court held that writs of mandamus and writs of pro-
hibition are prospective only and cannot be used to reverse what
is already done.65
In re Commonwealth of Virginia invoked the original jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court of Virginia.66 The case arose from the
protracted capital murder prosecution of Daryl Atkins.67 Atkins
was first convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in
1998.6 The case was appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia,
and the court affirmed with respect to guilt, but reversed and re-
manded regarding the penalty phase.69 On retrial, Atkins again
was sentenced to death.70 That sentence was affirmed by the Su-
preme Court of Virginia,7 but reversed by the United States Su-
preme Court in the landmark case that held that the death penal-
ty cannot be imposed on a defendant who was mentally retarded
62. Id. at 34-35, 645 S.E.2d at 265 (quoting Myers v. Trice, 86 Va. 835, 842, 11 S.E.
428, 430 (1890)) (internal citations omitted).
63. Id. (quoting Lowe v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare of Richmond, 231 Va. 277, 280, 343
S.E.2d 70, 72 (1986)).
64. 278 Va. 1, 8, 677 S.E.2d 236, 238-39 (2009) (citing Gannon v. State Corp. Comm'n,
243 Va. 480, 482, 416 S.E.2d 446, 447 (1972)).
65. Id. at 10, 17, 677 S.E.2d at 239, 244 (quoting In re Dep't of Corrs., 222 Va. 454,
461, 281 S.E.2d 857, 861 (1981)).
66. Id. at 5, 677 S.E.2d at 237; see VA. CONST. art. VI, § 1; VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-309
(Repl. Vol. 2003 & Cum. Supp. 2009).
67. In re Commonwealth, 278 Va. at 5-6, 677 S.E.2d at 237.
68. Id.
69. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 160, 180, 510 S.E.2d 445, 457 (1999).
70. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 375, 378-79, 534 S.E.2d 312, 314 (2000).
71. Id. at 379, 534 S.E.2d at 314.
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at the time of the offense." In the third trial, the jury found that
Atkins was not mentally retarded and again sentenced him to
death.73 That conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court of
Virginia.74 The case was remanded to the trial court with direc-
tions to conduct a trial on the issue of whether Atkins was men-
tally retarded at the time of the offense.7 5 Prior to the fourth trial,
the defense alleged that the prosecution had violated its obliga-
tions under Brady v. Maryland 7 in failing to turn over exculpato-
ry evidence to the defense. 7 The trial court agreed that there had
been a material Brady violation and, as a remedy, sentenced
Atkins to life in prison . 7 The prosecution sought a writ of man-
damus and a writ of prohibition compelling the trial court to va-
cate its final order sentencing Atkins to life in prison and to con-
duct the hearing on the issue of Atkins's mental retardation.79
The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that neither a writ of
mandamus nor a writ of prohibition was proper under the facts of
the case.8 0 The court noted that:
"A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedial process, which is
not awarded as a matter of right but in the exercise of a sound judi-
cial discretion. Due to the drastic character of the writ, the law has
placed safeguards around it. Consideration should be had for the ur-
gency which prompts an exercise of the discretion, the interests of
the public and third persons, the results which would follow upon a
refusal of the writ, as well as the promotion of substantial justice. In
doubtful cases the writ will be denied, but [when] the right involved
and the duty sought to be enforced are clear and certain and [when
there is no other available specific and adequate remedy the writ
will issue."8'
The court ruled that mandamus cannot be used to grant the
Commonwealth a right to appeal the final order in a criminal
72. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
73. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 144, 147, 631 S.E.2d 93, 94 (2006).
74. Id. at 148, 631 S.E.2d at 94.
75. Id.
76. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that "the suppression by the prosecution of evi-
dence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is ma-
terial either to guilt as to punishment, irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecu-
tion").
77. In re Commonwealth, 278 Va. 1, 7, 677 S.E.2d 236, 238 (2009).
78. Id. at 7-8, 677 S.E.2d at 238.
79. See id. at 8, 17, 677 S.E.2d at 238, 243.
80. Id. at 18, 677 S.E.2d at 244.
81. Id. at 8, 677 S.E.2d at 238-39 (quoting Gannon v. State Corp. Comm'n, 243 Va.
480, 482, 416 S.E.2d 446, 447 (1992).
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case where the Commonwealth would otherwise have no right to
appeal:
"In relation to courts and judicial officers, [mandamus] cannot be
made to perform the functions of a writ of error or appeal, or other
legal proceeding to review or correct errors, or to anticipate and fo-
restall judicial action. It may be appropriately used and is often used
to compel courts to act [when] they refuse to act and ought to act, but
not to direct and control the judicial discretion to be exercised in the
performance of the act to be done; to compel courts to hear and de-
cide where they have jurisdiction, but not to pre-determine the deci-
sion to be made; to require them to proceed to judgment, but not to
fix and prescribe the judgment to be rendered." 2
The supreme court ruled that mandamus "does not lie to compel
an officer to undo what he has done in the exercise of his judg-
ment or discretion" and cannot be used to "compel an officer to do
what he had already determined ought not to be done. 83 Instead,
mandamus is prospective only."
Applying those principles to the facts of the case, the supreme
court ruled that mandamus does not lie to compel the trial judge
to hold a hearing on the issue of whether Atkins was mentally re-
tarded.85 The court held that "mandamus cannot be used by the
Commonwealth or any other litigant to collaterally attack or va-
cate a final judgment entered by a circuit court upon the conclu-
sion of a criminal proceeding."88
Similarly, the court held that a writ of prohibition did not lie
under the facts of the case. As its name suggests, the writ of
prohibition "commands the person to whom it is directed not to do
something which.., he is about to do."88 "If the thing be already
done, it is manifest the writ of prohibition cannot undo it, for that
would require an affirmative act; and the only effect of a writ of
82. Id. at 9-10, 677 S.E.2d at 239 (quoting Page v. Clopton, 1 Va. (30 Gratt.) 415, 418
(1878)).
83. Id. at 9, 677 S.E.2d at 239 (quoting Thurston v. Hudgins, 93 Va. 780, 784, 20
S.E.2d 966, 968 (1895)).
84. Id. (quoting Richlands Med. Ass'n v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 384, 387, 337 S.E.2d
737, 740 (1985)).
85. Id. at 10, 677 S.E.2d at 239.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 17, 677 S.E.2d at 244.
88. Id., 677 S.E.2d at 243 (quoting In re Dep't of Corrs., 222 Va. 454, 461, 281 S.E.2d
857, 861 (1981)).
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prohibition is to suspend all action, and to prevent any further
proceeding in the prohibited direction."89
F. Local Rules
In two cases, the Supreme Court of Virginia applied Virginia
Code section 8.01-490 to reverse the trial court's application of a
local rule that infringed on the substantive rights of a litigant.
In the first case, Collins v. Shepherd, the Supreme Court of
Virginia invalidated a local rule that the circuit court of the City
of Norfolk instituted to control its docket.91 Because the local rule
was invalid, an order dismissing a case with prejudice pursuant
to the rule was "void ab initio and subject to challenge at any
time."92
Collins brought an action in Norfolk Circuit Court against
Shepherd for damages arising from Shepherd's alleged negligent
operation of a motor vehicle. 93 After Collins failed to serve
Shepherd within the required one year of filing,94 the circuit court
sua sponte notified Collins that the case would be dismissed un-
less Collins could show that he exercised due diligence to effect
service. 95 The trial court was acting pursuant to its Local Rule
2(F)(3), a rule based roughly on Virginia Supreme Court Rule
3:5(e).96 Collins failed to appear on the hearing date, and the case
was dismissed with prejudice. 97 Five months later, Collins came
forward and asked the circuit court to reinstate his case. 9 Ulti-
mately, the trial court refused to vacate the dismissal order, and
Collins's suit was dismissed with prejudice for failing to serve
Shepherd within one year.99
89. Id. (quoting In re Dep't of Corrs., 222 Va. at 461, 281 S.E.2d at 861 (1981)).
90. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-4 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
91. 274 Va. 390, 394, 402-03, 649 S.E.2d 672, 673, 678 (2007).
92. Id. at 403, 649 S.E.2d at 678.
93. Id. at 394, 649 S.E.2d at 673.
94. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-275.1, 8.01-277 (Repl. Vol. 2007) (prescribing the require-
ments and penalties for service of process); VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:5 (Repl. Vol. 2007) (describing
the mechanics at service of process).
95. Collins, 274 Va. at 394, 649 S.E.2d at 673.
96. See id. (citing VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:5(e) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 395, 649 S.E.2d at 673.
99. Id. at 397, 649 S.E.2d at 675.
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The supreme court reversed and remanded.100 Virginia Code
section 8.01-4 authorizes circuit courts to adopt docket control
measures so long as they do not "'abridge the substantive rights
of the parties."'1, ' Norfolk's Local Rule 2(F)(3), authorizing the cir-
cuit court to dismiss sua sponte actions such as Collins's that
have not been served within one year, exceeded the court's au-
thority to control its docket under Virginia Code section 8.01-4.102
Norfolk's local rule allowed for dismissal with prejudice when a
plaintiff otherwise would have been able to nonsuit and refile. 103
Although the local rule was based on the supreme court's Rule
3:5, the supreme court's rule does not permit courts sua sponte to
dismiss cases that have not been served within one year. 0 4 In-
stead, Rule 3:5 applies only when a defendant who has not been
served within one year comes forward and asks for dismissal of
the case. 10 5 Therefore, the local rule abridged Collins's substantive
right to nonsuit and refile. 06 Because the local rule is invalid, the
order dismissing Collins's action was void ab initio and was not
subject to the twenty-one-day limitation period under Rule 1:1.107
Collins was free to challenge the circuit court's dismissal of his
action at any time. 08
The supreme court observed that Virginia Code section 8.01-
335 permits the circuit court to control its docket by discontinuing
(rather than dismissing) cases after prolonged periods of inactivi-
ty.109 In those instances, the plaintiff can move to have the case
reinstated. 110 The supreme court also noted that Virginia Code
section 8.01-335(D), which the General Assembly adopted in
2007, permits circuit courts to strike cases from their dockets and
order them discontinued if there has been no service within one
year."' The plaintiff must be given thirty days' advance notice of
100. Id. at 403, 649 S.E.2d at 678.
101. Id. at 399, 649 S.E.2d at 676 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-4 (Repl. Vol. 2007)).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 397-98, 649 S.E.2d at 675 (citing Gilbreath v. Brewster, 230 Va. 436, 440,
463 S.E.2d 836, 837 (1995)).
105. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:5 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
106. Collins, 274 Va. at 399, 649 S.E.2d at 676.
107. Id. at 402, 649 S.E.2d at 678 (citing VA. SUP. CT. R. 1:1 (Repl. Vol. 2007)).
108. Id. at 403, 649 S.E.2d at 678.
109. Id. at 400-01, 649 S.E.2d at 676-77 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-335 (Repl. Vol.
2007)).
110. Id. at 401, 649 S.E.2d at 677.
111. Id. at 401 n.7, 649 S.E.2d at 677 n.7 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-335(D) (Repl.
2009]
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the proposed dismissal and must be afforded the opportunity to
nonsuit before the entry of the discontinuance order.112 The su-
preme court expressed no opinion about whether Norfolk's local
rule would pass muster under Virginia Code section 8.01-
335(D). 113
In the second case concerning local rules, Martin v. Duncan,
the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the trial court's imposi-
tion, pursuant to a local rule, of the costs of the jury on a plaintiff
who took a nonsuit as of right on the day of trial. 114 Martin sued
Duncan for negligence in Chesapeake Circuit Court. 115 At trial,
Martin moved for a nonsuit. 1 6 The trial court granted the non-
suit, but assessed Martin $540 for the costs of the jury, stating
that assessing jury costs is "pretty standard here in this court.""'
Indeed, the trial court had a local rule that permitted assessing a
party in a civil case with the costs of the jury if the clerk and jury
administrator were not notified prior to the day of trial that the
case was "not to be tried.""8
The supreme court reversed, holding that Virginia Code section
8.01-380(C) limits those costs that may be assessed against a
plaintiff such as Martin who takes a nonsuit as a matter of right
within seven days of trial to "'reasonable witness fees and travel
costs of expert witnesses scheduled to appear at trial."'1' 9 The trial
court may not impose additional limitations beyond those autho-
rized by statute; otherwise, the party's absolute right to take a
nonsuit would be eroded.'20 The trial court's local rule cannot be
the basis to assess the costs of the jury on Martin.12 Under Vir-
ginia Code section 8.01-4, a local rule cannot be enforced if it is
"inconsistent with any statutory provision or has the affect of ab-




114. 277 Va. 204, 206, 671 S.E.2d 151, 152 (2009).
115. Id. at 206, 671 S.E.2d at 152.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 206-07 n.2, 671 S.E.2d at 152 n.2.
119. Id. at 207, 671 S.E.2d at 153 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-380(C) (Repl. Vol.
2007 & Cum. Supp. 2009)).
120. See id. (quoting Janvier v. Arminio, 272 Va. 353, 365, 634 S.E.2d 754, 760 (2006)).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 208, 671 S.E.2d at 153 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-4 (Repl. Vol. 2007)).
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Both Collins v. Shepherd and Martin v. Duncan indicate the
Supreme Court of Virginia's aversion to any local rules that give
a litigant fewer rights than he or she would enjoy under the Vir-
ginia Code or the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia.
G. Summary Judgment
The Supreme Court of Virginia has decided several cases in the
last two years that illustrate that, unlike the federal courts, it is
reluctant to approve of the grant of summary judgment. Although
a rule of court allows for summary judgment,'23 the supreme court
consistently holds that summary judgment is a drastic remedy
which should only be granted in those rare circumstances in
which no material facts are in dispute.2 4
The most recent of these cases is Fultz v. Delhaize America,
Inc., where the supreme court complained that "we are increa-
singly confronted with appeals of cases in which a trial court in-
correctly has short-circuited litigation pretrial and has decided
the dispute without permitting the parties to reach a trial on the
merits" by granting summary judgment. 12 After reviewing the
rulings of the trial court, the supreme court concluded that "[tihis
is another such case. '' 2 6
Fultz injured herself when she tripped over some metal bars
bolted on either side of an ATM inside a grocery store. 127 The trial
judge granted the grocery store summary judgment, ruling that
the protective bars were "open and obvious," and thus Fultz was
contributorily negligent as a matter of law. 128
The supreme court reversed, holding that the trial judge im-
permissibly "short-circuited" the litigation process by granting
123. VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:20 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
124. Fultz v. Delhaize American, Inc., 278 Va. 84, 88, 677 S.E.2d 272, 274 (2009) (citing
Stockbridge v. Germini Air Cargo, Inc., 269 Va. 609, 618, 611 S.E.2d 600, 604 (2005);
Smith v. Smith, 254 Va. 99, 103, 487 S.E.2d 212, 215 (1997); Slone v. General Motors
Corp., 249 Va. 520, 522 457 S.E.2d 51, 52 (1995)).
125. Id. at 88, 677 S.E.2d at 274 (citing Renner v. Stafford, 245 Va. 351, 352, 429
S.E.2d 218, 219 (1993); CaterCorp., Inc. v. Catering Concepts, Inc., 246 Va. 22, 24, 431
S.E.2d 277, 279 (1993)).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 87, 677 S.E.2d at 273-74.
128. Id. at 88, 677 S.E.2d at 274.
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summary judgment.12 The question of "whether a plaintiff is
guilty of contributory negligence is ordinarily a question of fact to
be decided by the fact finder." 130 Even if the bars were open and
obvious, "the plaintiff ha[d] the burden to show conditions outside
herself which prevented her seeing the dangerous condition" or
excused her failure to observe the dangerous condition. 131 "We are
of opinion that reasonable minds could differ as to whether under
the circumstances of this case, Fultz acted as a reasonable person
would have acted for her own safety."1 32 Therefore, the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment to the defendant grocery
store.
133
In Hyland v. Raytheon Technical Services Co., the Supreme
Court of Virginia reversed summary judgment for a defendant in
a defamation action.134 Hyland alleged that she had been defamed
by her former employer, Raytheon, in several statements it made
about her job performance. 135 When the case was first tried, Hyl-
and received a substantial award from the jury, but the verdict
was reversed on appeal. 13 In the first appeal, the supreme court
held that only two of Raytheon's statements about Hyland were
factual statements and thus possibly defamatory."'
Prior to the second trial, Raytheon moved for summary judg-
ment, arguing that the remaining two statements were indisput-
ably true, and thus not defamatory. 138 The trial court parsed each
of the separate factual allegations of the allegedly defamatory
statements and held that they were true as a matter of law.139 The
trial court therefore granted summary judgment to Raytheon. 140
129. See id. (citing Renner, 245 Va. at 352, 429 S.E.2d at 219; CaterCorp, 246 Va. at 24,
631 S.E.2d at 279).
130. Id. at 89, 677 S.E.2d at 275 (quoting Moses v. Sw. Va. Transit Mgmt. Co., 273 Va.
672, 678, 643 S.E.2d 156, 159-60 (2007)).
131. Id. at 90, 677 S.E.2d at 275.
132. Id. at 91, 677 S.E.2d at 276.
133. Id.
134. See 277 Va. 40, 49, 670 S.E.2d 746, 752 (2009).
135. Id. at 42, 670 S.E.2d at 748.
136. See id. at 43, 670 S.E.2d at 748-49 (citing Raytheon Tech. Servs. Co. v. Hyland,
273 Va. 292, 641 S.E.2d 84 (2007)).
137. Id.
138. Hyland v. Raytheon Technical Servs. Co., 75 Va. Cir. 497, 500 (Cir. Ct. 2007)
(Fairfax County).
139. See id. at 503-04.
140. Id. at 504.
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The supreme court reversed the grant of summary judgment.41
The court recited the general principle that factual statements
may be defamatory and statements of opinion are not actiona-
ble. 42 "In determining whether a statement is one of fact or opi-
nion, a court may not isolate one portion of the statement at issue
from another portion of the statement."'4 The allegedly defamato-
ry statement must be considered as a whole.'" In granting sum-
mary judgment, the trial court "improperly limited its analysis to
the separate factual portions of the alleged defamatory state-
ments and excluded the necessary consideration of each state-
ment as a whole, including any implications, inferences, or insin-
uations that reasonably could be drawn from each statement.""
The determination of whether an allegedly defamatory statement
is false is ordinarily a factual question to be resolved by the
jury.146 "Only if a plaintiff unequivocally has admitted the truth of
an allegedly defamatory statement, including the fair inferences,
implications, and insinuations that can be drawn from that
statement, may the trial judge award summary judgment to the
defendant on the basis that the statement is true."4 7 The court
concluded that:
By awarding summary judgment to Raytheon in the absence of such
admissions, the circuit court deprived Hyland of the opportunity to
present evidence to a jury to establish the falsity of the allegedly de-
famatory statements. The circuit court's judgment also denied Hyl-
and the right to have a jury consider each allegedly defamatory
statement as a whole.
148
Federal practitioners are sometimes surprised to learn that
Virginia practice generally does not allow for the use of either de-
positions 4 9 or affidavits"50 to support a motion for summary judg-
141. Hyland, 277 Va. at 49, 670 S.E.2d at 752.
142. Id. at 46, 47, 670 S.E.2d at 750 (citing Raytheon Tech. Servs. Co. v. Hyland, 273
Va. 292, 303, 641 S.E.2d 84, 90 (2007)).
143. Hyland, 277 Va. at 47, 670 S.E.2d at 751.
144. Id. (citing Gov't Micro Res., Inc. v. Jackson, 271 Va. 29, 40, 624 S.E.2d 63, 69
(2006)).
145. Id. at 48, 670 S.E.2d at 751.
146. Id.
147. Id. (citing Shutler v. Augusta Health Care for Women, 272 Va. 87, 91, 630 S.E.2d
313, 315 (2006); Stockbridge v. Gemini Air Cargo, Inc., 269 Va. 609, 618, 611 S.E.2d 600,
604 (2005)).
148. Id. at 49, 670 S.E.2d at 752.
149. VA. CODE ANN. §8.01-420 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2009); VA. Sup. CT. R.
3:20 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
150. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:20 (Repl. Vol. 2009); Stone v. Alley, 240 Va. 162, 163-64, 392
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ment. In Lloyd v. Kime, the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that
a litigant may not use depositions in support of a motion in limine
when the motion in limine is effectively a motion for summary
judgment.151
Lloyd alleged that he was partially paralyzed as a result of a
surgical procedure negligently performed by Dr. Kime. 152 Lloyd
named as his sole expert Dr. Corkill, who was expected to testify
as to the standard of care, Dr. Kime's deviation from the standard
of care, and causation. 5 3 Dr. Kime moved in limine to exclude the
testimony of Dr. Corkill because he did not meet the require-
ments of Virginia Code section 8.01-581.20."5 After reviewing Dr.
Corkill's deposition, as well as the depositions of Dr. Kime and his
expert, the trial court excluded Dr. Corkill's testimony. 5 5 The tri-
al court then awarded summary judgment to Dr. Kime because
Lloyd was left without an expert. 56
Under Virginia Supreme Court Rule 3:20, "no motion for sum-
mary judgment or to strike the evidence shall be sustained when
based in whole or part upon any discovery depositions.. ." unless
all parties agree.'57 The supreme court reasoned that "the motion
in limine [was] functionally a motion for summary judgment. 1 8
Therefore, discovery deposition testimony could not be used in
support of the motion in limine unless Lloyd consented or ac-
quiesced to its use. 59 Although deposition testimony may not be
used to support a motion that is the functional equivalent to a
motion for summary judgment, the supreme court affirmed the
trial court's exclusion of Dr. Corkill's testimony because Lloyd ac-
quiesced to the use of the deposition by not voicing an objection.1°
One cannot review the Supreme Court of Virginia's jurispru-
dence on summary judgment without concluding that it is far
S.E.2d 486, 486-87 (1990). An exception to the general rule is found in VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-696 (Repl. Vol. 2007), which expressly permits the use of affidavits in supporting
summary judgment in a pro se prisoner civil action.
151. 275 Va. 98, 107, 654 S.E.2d 563, 568 (2008).
152. Id. at 104, 654 S.E.2d at 567.
153. Id. at 105, 654 S.E.2d at 567.
154. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.20 (Cum. Supp. 2009).
155. Lloyd, 275 Va. at 105, 654 S.E.2d at 567.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 106, 654 S.E.2d at 568 (quoting VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:20 (Repl. Vol. 2008)).
158. See id. at 107, 654 S.E.2d at 568.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 107-08, 654 S.E.2d at 568-69.
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more difficult to be awarded summary judgment in Virginia state
courts than in federal courts. The supreme court is loath to find a
case in which the litigants have raised no dispute of material fact
warranting a trial on the merits.
H. Jurors and Juries
Robert M. Seh Co. v. O'Donnell presents the not uncommon sit-
uation where, after the jury has been sworn, a juror expresses an
opinion that would disqualify the juror from service on the jury. 161
Here, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that if a jury has been
empanelled and the impartiality of a juror is brought into ques-
tion, it is an abuse of the trial court's discretion to deny a motion
for a mistrial if the movant establishes the probability of the ju-
ror's prejudice preventing a fair trial.162
The O'Donnells contracted with the Robert M. Seh Company
for the installation of a Fox brand swimming pool at their resi-
dence. 163 After the O'Donnells learned that the company installed
a Vyn-All liner instead of a Fox liner, they brought suit for viola-
tion of Virginia's Consumer Protection Act. 64 During voir dire,
Juror Lyons disclosed that he sometimes helped his father-in-law
install swimming pools. 16' No follow up questions were asked, and
Juror Lyons was seated as a juror.6 6 After opening statements,
when Juror Lyons presumably learned more about the case, he
disclosed that he knew from his father-in-law that Vyn-All pool
liners are inferior. 67 Lyons related that he was now biased
against the defense counsel, as Lyons felt that counsel "[did not]
know what he [was] talking about" if he believed that Vyn-All
liners were of good quality. 166 Juror Lyons acknowledged he had to
base his verdict on the evidence in the case but he could not
"erase" from his "brain" what he knew about the relative merits of
161. 277 Va. 599, 602, 675 S.E.2d 202, 204 (2009).
162. See id. at 604-05, 675 S.E.2d at 205-06 (citing Taylor v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.
App. 12, 18, 486 S.E.2d 108, 111 (1997); Haddad v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 325, 330, 329
S.E.2d 17, 20 (1985)).
163. Id. at 601, 675 S.E.2d at 203.
164. Id., 675 S.E.2d at 203-04 (citing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-200 to 59.1-207 (Repl. Vol.
2006 & Cum. Supp. 2009)).
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the two liners.169 The defense did not agree to proceed with six ju-
rors and instead moved for a mistrial.7 ° The trial court denied the
motion for a mistrial.17 The O'Donnells were ultimately awarded
about $100,000 in damages, penalties, and attorneys' fees. 72
The supreme court reversed, holding that the motion for a mi-
strial should have been granted. 7 3 A trial court's ruling denying a
motion for a mistrial will be set aside on appeal only if the ruling
constituted an abuse of discretion.114 "[Olnce a jury has been em-
panelled and the impartiality of a juror is subsequently brought
into question, it is an abuse of discretion to deny a motion for a
mistrial if the proponent of the motion establishes the probability
of prejudice such that the fairness of the trial is subject to ques-
tion."' 75 In this case, Juror Lyons never retracted his statements
that he had a fixed opinion that Vyn-All liners were inferior to
Fox liners and that the defense counsel "didn't know what he was
talking about.' 176 Thus, retaining Lyons on the jury presented a
high probability of prejudice to the defendant pool company that
would bring the fairness of the trial into question. 17
I. Jury Instructions
The Supreme Court of Virginia disapproved of the jury instruc-
tion on the tort concept of "unavoidable accident," but left undis-
turbed the instruction on "sudden emergency" in the case of Han-
cock-Underwood v. Knight.7  The supreme court ruled that the
"unavoidable accident" jury instruction should no longer be given
in any case.79 It is now always error to grant that instruction. 180
The "sudden emergency" instruction should rarely be given.'
169. Id. at 602-03, 675 S.E.2d at 204-05.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 603, 675 S.E.2d at 205.
172. Id. at 601, 675 S.E.2d at 204.
173. Id. at 605, 675 S.E.2d at 206.
174. Id. at 603, 675 S.E.2d at 205 (citing Westlake Properties v. Westlake Pointe Prop.
Owners Ass'n, 273 Va. 107, 124 659 S.E.2d 257, 267 (2009)).
175. Id. at 605, 675 S.E.2d at 206.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. 277 Va. 127, 137, 670 S.E.2d 720, 727 (2009).
179. Id. at 134, 670 S.E.2d at 724.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 137, 670 S.E.2d at 726 (citing Jones v. Ford Motor Co., 263 Va. 237, 263, 559
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Hancock, while driving, suffered an "acute intracranial event"
that caused him to lose consciousness and drift into oncoming
traffic.82 He struck Knight's vehicle, injuring Knight. 183 Hancock
died, and Knight sued his personal representative. 4 At the con-
clusion of the jury trial, Hancock's personal representative sought
both an "unavoidable accident" instruction and a "sudden emer-
gency" instruction.'8 ' The trial judge denied both, and the jury re-
turned a verdict in favor of Knight.8
6
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's decision to not in-
struct the jury on the concept of unavoidable accident.87 The
model instruction on unavoidable accident reads as follows: "An
unavoidable accident is one which ordinary care and diligence
could not have prevented or one which occurred in the absence of
negligence by any party to this action."18 8 The jury is usually in-
structed that if it finds that the accident was "unavoidable," there
can be no award of damages to the plaintiff because the defen-
dant was not negligent.8 9 Previously, the supreme court has said
that the unavoidable accident instruction should rarely be given
because it is "apt to give a jury an 'easy way of avoiding instead of
deciding the issue made by the evidence in the case."' 90 Those
states that disapprove of the instruction in all cases reason that
the unavoidable accident instruction merely restates the law of
negligence, serves no useful purpose, overemphasizes the defen-
dant's case, and is apt to confuse or mislead the jury.191
In Hancock-Underwood, the supreme court reasoned that the
concept sought to be addressed by the unavoidable accident in-
struction was adequately addressed by the typical issues instruc-
tion' 92 the finding instruction,9 3 the definition of negligence ' 94 the
S.E.2d 592, 605 (2002)).
182. Id. at 129-130, 670 S.E.2d at 721-22.
183. Id. at 129, 670 S.E.2d at 721-22.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 130, 670 S.E.2d at 722.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 136, 670 S.E.2d at 725.
188. Va. Model Jury Instructions - Civil, Jury Instr. No. 4.018 (Repl. Vol. 2009) [herei-
nafter Instructions].
189. See Hancock-Underwood, 277 Va. at 134-35, 136, 670 S.E.2d at 724-25.
190. Id. at 136, 670 S.E.2d at 725 (quoting Chadorov v. Eley, 239 Va. 528, 531, 391
S.E.2d 68, 70 (1990)).
191. Id.
192. See id. at 136, 670 S.E.2d at 725; Instructions, supra note 188, No. 3.000.
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definition of proximate cause, 195 and the definition of the burden
of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. 196 "[W]e join those
states and hold that it is error to grant an unavoidable accident
instruction.'197
Although the "sudden emergency" instruction should rarely be
granted, it is not always error to grant such an instruction. 198 "A
sudden emergency is an event or a combination of circumstances
that calls for immediate action without giving time for the delibe-
rate exercise of judgment."191 If a driver is confronted with a sud-
den emergency and acts as a reasonable person would have acted
under the circumstances, then he or she is not negligent.200 The
supreme court opined that the sudden emergency instruction, un-
like the unavoidable accident instruction, does not merely restate
the law of negligence: "It adds new considerations to the negli-
gence equation. A person confronted with a sudden emergency
must 'act[] as an ordinarily prudent person would have done un-
der the same or similar circumstances.' This additional require-
ment is not addressed in the general negligence instructions or-
dinarily given (as in this case)."201
The supreme court concluded that the trial judge in Hancock-
Underwood did not err in refusing to grant the proffered sudden
emergency instruction. 20 2 The evidence was that the defendant did
not react to a sudden emergency. 2 3 He was unconscious. 24 There-
fore, the instruction was not supported by the evidence in the
193. See Hancock-Underwood, 277 Va. at 135, 670 S.E.2d at 724, 725; Instructions, su-
pra note 188, No. 3.050.
194. See Hancock-Underwood, 277 Va. at 135, 670 S.E.2d at 724-25; Instructions, su-
pra note 188, No. 4.000.
195. See Hancock-Underwood, 277 Va. at 135, 670 S.E.2d at 725; Instructions, supra
note 188, No. 5.000.
196. See Hancock-Underwood, 277 Va. at 135, 670 S.E.2d at 725; Instructions, supra
note 188, Nos. 3.010, 3.100.
197. Hancock-Underwood, 277 Va. at 136, 670 S.E.2d at 725.
198. Id. at 137, 670 S.E.2d at 726 (quoting Jones v. Ford Motor Co., 263 Va. 237, 263,
559 S.E.2d 592, 605 (2002)).
199. Id. at 136, 670 S.E.2d at 726; Instructions, supra note 188, No. 7.000.
200. Hancock-Underwood, 277 Va. at 137, 670 S.E.2d at 726; see Instructions, supra
note 188, No. 7.000.
201. Hancock-Underwood, 277 Va. at 137, 670 S.E.2d at 726 (quoting Vahdat v. Hol-
land, 274 Va. 417, 421, 649 S.E.2d 691, 693 (2007)).
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case.2"5 In an effort to offer guidance to the bench and bar, Justice
Lemons suggested that it might have been proper for the jury to
have been instructed that Hancock was not negligent if he was
suddenly stricken by an unanticipated medical illness while driv-
ing, which rendered it impossible for him to control his automo-
bile .206
The supreme court's view that the sudden emergency instruc-
tion "adds new considerations to the negligence equation"
presents some problems. 20 7 Negligence is the failure to exercise
ordinary care.20 "Ordinary care is the care [that] a reasonable
person would have used" under the circumstances to avoid in-
jury.20 "A person confronted with a sudden emergency must 'act
[as] an ordinary prudent person would have done under the same
or similar circumstances ... ,-'210 It is difficult to discern any
substantive difference between a person who is not negligent at
all, and one who is not negligent because, when confronted with a
sudden emergency, reacts as a reasonable person would have
reacted in order to avoid injury.
J. Finality of Consent Orders
The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that a consent order, after
the expiration of twenty-one days, is a final order and an enforce-
able contract between the parties.2 11 A court may not vary the
terms of final consent orders any more than it may vary the
terms of a contract entered into by the parties.212 In McLane v.
Vereen, the supreme court found that the trial court erred in
205. Id. at 139, 670 S.E.2d at 727.
206. See id. at 138, 670 S.E.2d at 726-27 (citing Brinser v. Young, 208 Va. 525, 527,
158 S.E.2d 759, 761 (1968); Driver v. Broots, 176 Va. 317, 327, 105 S.E.2d 887, 892
(1940)).
207. Id. at 137, 670 S.E.2d at 726.
208. Id. at 135, 670 S.E.2d at 725.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 137, 670 S.E.2d at 726 (quoting Vahdat v. Holland, 274 Va. 417, 421, 649
S.E.2d 691, 693 (2007)).
211. McLane v. Vereen, 278 Va. 65, 73, 677 S.E.2d 294, 298-99 (2009) (citing VA. SUP.
CT. R. 1:1 (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
212. See id. at 70-71, 677 S.E.2d at 297 (citing Comcast of Chesterfield County, Inc. v.
Bd. of Supervisors, 277 Va. 293, 301, 672 S.E.2d 870, 873 (2009); Upper Occoquan Sewage
Auth. v. Blake Constr. Co., 275 Va. 41, 60, 655 S.E.2d 10, 21 (2008); James v. James, 263
Va. 474, 481, 562 S.E.2d 133, 137 (2002); Daniels v. Truck & Equip. Corp., 205 Va. 579,
585, 139 S.E.2d 31, 35 (1964)).
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awarding one party a final consent order less than the agreed-
upon daily fine for the other party's non-compliance with the
terms of the order. 213
Vereen maintained excessive junk in his yard in Fairfax Coun-
ty.214 He entered into a consent decree with the zoning adminis-
trator under which he agreed to clean up the yard by a date cer-
tain.215 The order provided for a fine of $100 per day for every day
after that date that the yard remained strewn with junk.216 Ve-
reen did not clean up his yard for 206 days beyond the date pro-
vided for in the consent decree."7 The zoning administrator
sought an order requiring Vereen to pay $20,600 in fines. 18 The
trial court found that the requested fines were unreasonable and
constituted an unenforceable penalty and imposed fines in the
amount of $3,500.219
The supreme court reversed, ruling that the consent decree was
a final order.220 It "disposed of the entire matter before the court,
gave all the contemplated relief, and left nothing to be done ex-
cept the ministerial execution of the court's decree."221 A consent
decree is like a contract.222 "When a consent decree is final..., it
is enforceable in the same manner as any other court decree or
order and may be enforced by the imposition of sanctions or by a
contempt citation." 2 3 A consent decree that is final constitutes a
judgment of the court, is conclusive, and "is not subject to colla-
teral attack except on jurisdictional grounds or for fraud or collu-
sion."224 The terms of the consent decree between the County and
Vereen were not subject to modification by the court after twenty-
213. Id. at 73, 677 S.E.2d at 299.
214. Id. at 67-68, 677 S.E.2d at 295-96.
215. Id. at 68, 677 S.E.2d at 296.
216. Id.
217. See id. at 69, 677 S.E.2d at 296.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 72, 677 S.E.2d at 298.
221. Id. (citing Comcast of Chesterfield County, Inc., 277 Va. at 301, 672 S.E.2d at 873;
Upper Occoquan Sewage Auth., 275 Va. at 60, 665 S.E.2d at 21; Daniels, 205 Va. at 585,
139 S.E.2d at 33).
222. Id. at 71, 677 S.E.2d at 297 (citing Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City
of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519 (1986)).
223. Id., 677 S.E.2d at 298.
224. Id. at 71-72, 677 S.E.2d at 298 (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Eades, 248 Va. 205,
288 (1994); Culpeper Nat'l Bank v. Morris, 168 Va. 379, 385-87 (1957)).
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one days.2 25 Thus, the amount of the daily fines was not subject to
attack on the grounds that it was unreasonable.216 Final judgment
was awarded to Fairfax County in the amount of $20,600.22
K. Appellate Practice
In the past two years, the Supreme Court of Virginia has de-
cided a number of cases of interest to the appellate practitioner.
The first such case, Commonwealth Transportation Commis-
sioner v. Target Corp.,228 serves as a primer of common mistakes
that result in an inadequate record for purposes of appeal. In af-
firming the circuit court's decision in this condemnation case, the
supreme court ruled that it could not entertain the appellant's
arguments because the appellant failed to make a proper proffer
of excluded evidence at trial for purposes of appellate review, ar-
gued inconsistent positions at trial and on appeal, and attempted
to raise arguments on appeal that had not been raised at trial.229
In Target, the transportation commissioner filed a petition for
condemnation, taking real property interests owned by Target in
order to construct a parkway. 230 Target filed an answer to the pe-
tition and claimed that it was entitled to just compensation for,
among other things, the loss of visibility it suffered after the con-
struction of the parkway. 21 The trial court confirmed the jury's
report setting just compensation to Target for Target's loss of vi-
sibility at $3.3 million; the transportation commissioner ap-
pealed.232
The supreme court affirmed.2 3 For each assignment of error
considered, the transportation commissioner had either failed to
proffer sufficient evidence at trial to allow for appellate review,
argued inconsistent positions, raised the arguments for the first
time on appeal, or had not asserted with specificity the error
225. Id. at 72, 677 S.E.2d at 298 (citing VA. SuP. CT. R. 1:1 (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
226. Id. at 73 (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 248 Va. at 288, 448 S.E.2d at 633; Culpeper
Nat'l Bank, 168 Va. at 385-87, 191 S.E.2d at 767-68).
227. Id. at 74, 677 S.E.2d at 299.
228. 274 Va. 341, 650 S.E.2d 92 (2007).
229. Id. at 348-52, 650 S.E.2d at 96-98.
230. Id. at 344, 650 S.E.2d at 94.
231. Id. at 345-46, 650 S.E.2d at 94-95.
232. Id. at 344, 650 S.E.2d at 94.
233. Id. at 353-54, 650 S.E.2d at 99.
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made by the trial court.214 The supreme court noted, "however,
that [it did] not decide whether a landowner, whose real property
is the subject of a condemnation proceeding, may recover damag-
es for loss of visibility to the residue of the real property. This is-
sue remains undecided in this Commonwealth."
215
In a case of first impression, the Supreme Court of Virginia ap-
plied the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine to refuse to consider
an appeal where the appellant was a fugitive in violation of the
orders that were the subject of the appeal.236 Sasson v. Shenhar
arose in the context of an international custody dispute.237 The
supreme court applied the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine to
refuse to consider the appeals of a father who, in violation of court
orders, had absconded with his child. 238
Sasson, the father, took the child to Spain contrary to the
court's order.239 The father was later found in contempt of court
for failing to return the child to Virginia. 240 While still in violation
of the trial court's orders, the father noted an appeal to the Court
of Appeals of Virginia. 241 The court of appeals, applying the Fugi-
tive Disentitlement Doctrine, refused to consider the merits of the
appeal. 24 2
The supreme court affirmed. 24 Under the Fugitive Disentitle-
ment Doctrine, "'an appellate court may dismiss the appeal of a
defendant who is a fugitive from justice during the pendency of
[the] appeal.' ' 2 - Although never before applied in Virginia, the
doctrine has wide acceptance in other states.24 15 "[We hold that
the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine may be applied in appropri-
ate cases whenever a court of this Commonwealth in the exercise
234. Id. at 348-53, 650 S.E.2d at 96-98.
235. Id. at 353-54, 650 S.E.2d at 99.
236. Sasson v. Shenhar, 276 Va. 611, 622, 667 S.E.2d 555, 561 (2008) (quoting Moscona
v. Shenhar, 50 Va. App. 238, 249, 649 S.E.2d 191, 196 (2007)).
237. Id. at 615, 667 S.E.2d at 556.
238. Id. at 618-20, 627-28, 667 S.E.2d at 558-59, 564.
239. Id. at 619-20, 667 S.E.2d at 559.
240. Id. at 621, 667 S.E.2d at 560.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 622, 667 S.E.2d at 560.
243. Id. at 629, 667 S.E.2d at 564.
244. Id. at 622, 667 S.E.2d at 561 (quoting Moscona v. Shenhar, 50 Va. App. 238, 249,
649 S.E.2d 191, 196 (2007)).
245. See id. at 622, 667 S.E.2d at 561 (quoting Moscona, 50 Va. App. at 249, 649 S.E.2d
at 196).
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of sound judicial discretion deems it necessary to protect the dig-
nity and power of the court from abuse by a litigant."246 The su-
preme court cautioned that denying a litigant access to the court
is a severe sanction.47 The Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine
should only be applied where the appellant is a fugitive, there is a
nexus between the appeal and the appellant's status as a fugitive,
and dismissal is necessary to effectuate the policy concerns un-
derlying the doctrine 4. 2 4 The doctrine must be applied with re-
straint and only when it is "'a reasonable response to the prob-
lems and needs that provoke it.' ' 249 Applying those principles to
the facts of the Sasson case, the supreme court ruled that the Fu-
gitive Disentitlement Doctrine was properly invoked by the court
of appeals to dismiss the father's appeals.2 5 0 The supreme court
concurred with the court of appeals' observation that the father
was "unwilling to submit to the jurisdiction of Virginia's courts
unless he receives a judgment in his favor."251
In Comcast of Chesterfield County, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors,
the Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed an appeal as improvi-
dently granted because the order appealed from was neither final
nor an appealable interlocutory order. 252
Comcast challenged the county's tax assessment of its personal
property. 253 It did not contest the county's valuation of the proper-
ty, but rather objected to the county's classifying some of its as-
sets as tangible personal property subject to taxation.2 54 The trial
court bifurcated the issue of classification from the issue of valua-
tion and entered an order classifying the disputed property as
tangible, and thus subject to taxation. 5 The trial court took un-
der advisement the issue of whether it was still necessary for the
246. Id. at 623, 667 S.E.2d at 561.
247. Id.
248. Id. (citing Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 215 (1st Cir. 2000); Magluta v. Samples,
162 F.3d 662, 554 (4th Cir. 1998); Atkinson v. Taylor, 277 F. Supp. 2d 382, 385 (D. Del.
2003)).
249. Id. (quoting Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823-24 (1996)).
250. Id. at 623-28, 667 S.E.2d at 561-64.
251. Id. at 627, 667 S.E.2d at 564.
252. 277 Va. 293, 307, 672 S.E.2d 870, 877 (2009).
253. Id. at 296, 672 S.E.2d at 870.
254. Id. at 297, 672 S.E.2d at 871.
255. Id. at 298-99, 672 S.E.2d at 872.
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court to determine the question of valuation.15 In the meantime,
Comcast appealed the order classifying the property as taxable.157
The supreme court dismissed the appeal as improvidently
granted.25 For the supreme court to have jurisdiction of Comcast's
appeal, the order from which Comcast appealed must be either a
final order or an interlocutory order from which an appeal is sta-
tutorily authorized.5 9
We have described a final order as one "which disposes of the whole
subject[,] gives all the relief that is contemplated, and leaves nothing
to be done by the court .... On the other hand, every decree which
leaves anything in the cause to be done by the court is interlocutory
as between the parties remaining in the court."
260
The order in Comcast clearly was not final.261 At the time of the
order, the circuit court was still considering whether there needed
to be a determination of the valuation issues.262
Nor was the order in Comcast one in which an interlocutory
appeal is permitted by statute.263 Virginia Code section 8.01-670
permits a person to petition for an appeal to the supreme court if
aggrieved by: "[Any judgment in a controversy concerning: [tihe
right of ... a county ... to levy ... taxes; or ... [t]he construction
of any statute, ordinance, or county proceeding imposing taxes;
or... a final judgment in any other civil case. '' 26 4 The court re-
jected Comcast's argument that there is no need for a final order
where the appeal concerns the right of a county to levy taxes or
the construction of a county proceeding imposing taxes under
Virginia Code sections 8.01-670(A)(1)(f) and (g).265 When the Gen-
eral Assembly authorizes the appeal of interlocutory orders, it
does so expressly and unambiguously. 26 6 In the absence of an ex-
press authorization in Virginia Code section 8.01-670(A)(1) allow-
ing appeals of interlocutory orders in the types of controversies
256. Id. at 299, 672 S.E.2d at 872.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 307, 672 S.E.2d at 877.
259. Id. at 300, 672 S.E.2d at 873.
260. Id. at 301, 672 S.E.2d. at 873 (quoting Dearing v. Walter, 174 Va. 555, 561, 9
S.E.2d 336, 338 (1940)).
261. Id., 672 S.E.2d at 873-74.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 306, 672 S.E.2d at 876.
264. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-670(A)(1)(f)-(g), (A)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2009).
265. Comcast, 277 Va. at 302, 672 S.E.2d at 874.
266. Id. at 306, 672 S.E.2d at 876.
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listed there, the supreme court refused to infer such authoriza-
tion.267 The court held that any appeal from one of the controver-
sies listed in Virginia Code section 8.01-670(A)(1) must be from a
final order.268
In Seguin v. Northrop Grumman Systems Corp., the Supreme
Court of Virginia ruled that an order compelling arbitration is not
an appealable final order. 269 In that case, Seguin brought suit
against her employer, alleging defamation in her work perfor-
mance evaluation. 270 The employer, Northrop Grumman, filed a
motion to compel arbitration, which the trial court granted.271 Se-
guin appealed to the supreme court.272
Seguin's appeal was dismissed because the order compelling
arbitration is not a final order.2 73 Under Virginia Code section
8.01-581.016:
An appeal may be taken from: (1) An order denying an application to
compel arbitration... (2) An order granting an application to stay
arbitration... (3) An order confirming or denying an award; (4) An
order modifying or correcting an award; (5) An order vacating an
award without directing a rehearing; or (6) A judgment or decree en-
tered pursuant to the provisions of this article." 4
The court noted that the statute "does not grant a right to ap-
peal an order granting an application to compel arbitration."275
The court in Seguin was forced to address contrary language in
one of its earlier cases. 276 In Amchem Products v. Asbestos Cases
Plaintiffs, the supreme court stated that "[Virginia] Code § 8.01-
581.016 confers upon this [clourt jurisdiction to review a circuit
court's order that denies or compels arbitration. 2 77 Because Am-
chem involved an appeal from a circuit court's order denying an
application to compel arbitration, the supreme court reasoned
that its statement in Amchem-that it had jurisdiction to review
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. 277 Va. 244, 249, 672 S.E.2d 877, 879 (2009).
270. Id. at 246, 672 S.E.2d at 877-78.
271. Id., 672 S.E.2d at 878.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 248, 672 S.E.2d at 879.
274. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.016 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2009).
275. 277 Va. at 248, 672 S.E.2d at 879 (emphasis added).
276. Id.
277. 264 Va. 89, 96, 563 S.E.2d 739, 742-43 (2002) (emphasis added).
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a circuit court's order that "denies or compels arbitration"-was
dictum to the extent it included the words "or compels." 278 The
supreme court concluded that Amchem did not circumvent the
lack of an express right under Virginia Code section 8.01-581.016
to an appeal from an order compelling arbitration.219
The supreme court also held that the order in Seguin was not a
final order within the meaning of Virginia Code section 8.01-
670(A)(3). 280 The circuit court retained jurisdiction to modify, cor-
rect, or vacate the arbitration award. 28 Therefore, there was more
for the circuit court to do other than ministerially superintend the
execution of the order.282
L. Appeals from District Courts to Circuit Courts
The Supreme Court of Virginia decided two cases involving ap-
peals of district court orders to the circuit court. In Architectural
Stone, LLC v. Wolcott Center, LLC, the supreme court held that
the district court's denial of a motion to set aside default judg-
ment is not a final, appealable order under Virginia Code section
16.1-106, and the circuit court correctly dismissed such an appeal
for lack of jurisdiction. 283 In Architectural Stone, the general dis-
trict court granted a default judgment in favor of Wolcott and
against Architectural Stone."' Several months later, Architectur-
al Stone moved to set aside the default judgment, which was de-
nied by the district court.2"5 Architectural Stone filed a timely ap-
peal to the circuit court, which ruled that the district court's order
was not appealable. 286
The supreme court agreed with the circuit court that the order
denying the motion to set aside the default judgment was not ap-
pealable.8 7 Only final orders may be appealed to the circuit court,
278. Seguin, 277 Va. at 248, 672 S.E.2d at 879.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 248-49, 672 S.E.2d at 879.
281. Id.
282. See id.
283. 284 Va. 519, 521-23, 649 S.E.2d 670, 671 (2007) (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-106
(Rep]. Vol. 2003 & Cum. Supp. 2009)).
284. Id. at 521, 649 S.E.2d at 670.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 523, 649 S.E.2d at 671.
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and final orders are those that "dispose[ ] of the merits" of a
case. 2 8 An order denying a motion to set aside default judgment is
like an order denying a motion for a new trial and does not dis-
pose of the merits of the case.2 9 The default judgment was a final
order; the denial of the motion to set aside was not.290
In Neighbors v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
reversed the circuit court's determination that the general district
court's denial of a writ of coram nobis is not appealable to the cir-
cuit court. 291 Because the dispute was non-monetary in nature,
Virginia Code section 16.1-106, which gives circuit courts jurisdic-
tion to hear appeals from a general district court's civil cases
when the amount in controversy is greater than fifty dollars, did
not apply.292 Therefore, the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear
the appeal under Virginia Code section 17.1-513.293 The circuit
correctly held, however, that a writ of coram nobis was not the
proper vehicle for a criminal defendant to challenge his conviction
for resisting arrest on the grounds that he was too medicated to
enter a knowing and voluntary guilty plea.2 94
III. RULE CHANGES
A. Admission of Foreign Attorneys Pro Hac Vice
On July 1, 2007, the Supreme Court of Virginia rewrote Rule
1A:4 that governs out-of-state attorneys participating pro hac vice
in cases pending before a Virginia tribunal.2 95 An attorney who is
a member in good standing of an out-of-state bar must now file a
notarized application with the tribunal, accompanied by a non-
refundable application fee of two hundred fifty dollars (payable to




291. 274 Va. 503, 511, 650 S.E.2d 514, 518 (2007).
292. Id. at 511, 650 S.E.2d at 518 (citing City of Virginia Beach v. Siebert, 253 Va. 230,
251-54, 483 S.E.2d 214, 215-16 (1997)); see VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-106 (Repl. Vol. 2003 &
Cum. Supp. 2009).
293. Neighbors, 274 Va. at 511, 650 S.E.2d at 518; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-513
(Cum. Supp. 2009).
294. Neighbors, 274 Va. at 511-12, 650 S.E.2d at 518-19.
295. VA. SUP. CT. R. 1A:4 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
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the tribunal in which the out-of-state lawyer desires to appear.296
The out-of-state attorney must associate with local counsel who is
an active member in good standing with the Virginia State Bar.297
Local counsel must file a motion to associate the out-of-state at-
torney as counsel pro hac vice with the tribunal where the case is
pending.98 Whether to grant the motion is discretionary with the
tribunal;299 however, the tribunal "shall deny the motion if the
out-of-state lawyer has been previously admitted pro hac vice be-
fore any tribunal or tribunals on Virginia in twelve (12) cases
within the last twelve (12) months preceding the date of the cur-
rent application."300 The supreme court developed a form for use
by out-of-state attorneys applying to be admitted pro hac vice to
appear in a case before a Virginia tribunal20 1
B. Foreign Legal Consultants
New Rule 1A:7 became effective on January 1, 2009.02 It allows
an attorney admitted to practice law in a foreign country to apply
to the Virginia Board of Bar Examiners to be certified as a foreign
legal consultant °. 30 Once certified, the foreign legal consultant
"may render legal services in the Commonwealth only with re-
gard to matters involving the law of [the] foreign nation(s) in
which the person is admitted to practice or international law."304
Any foreign legal consultant certified pursuant to the Rule 1A:7 is
subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct governing Virginia
attorneys.30 5
C. Admission to Virginia Bar Without Examination
The Supreme Court of Virginia adopted regulations, effective
December 1, 2008, to guide the Virginia Board of Bar Examiners
in determining whether an attorney admitted to practice in
296. VA. SUP. CT. R. 1A:4(3)(a).
297. VA. SUP. CT. R. 1A:4(2).
298. VA. SUP. CT. R. 1A:4(3)(b).
299. VA. SUP. CT. R. IA:4(5).
300. Id.
301. See VA. SUP. CT. R., Appx. of Forms for Part One A, Form 1 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
302. VA. SUP. CT. R. 1A:7.
303. Id.
304. VA. SUP. CT. R. 1A:7(d).
305. VA. SUP. CT. R. 1A:7(f).
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another state or the District of Columbia should be admitted to
the Virginia Bar without sitting for the bar examination.30 6 The
regulations provide guidance in such matters as determining
whether the applicant has been engaged in the active practice of
law for the requisite period, whether the applicant intends to
practice full time in Virginia, whether the applicant is a person of
honest demeanor and good moral character, and whether the per-
son possesses the requisite fitness to perform the obligations and
responsibilities of a practicing attorney. °7
D. Counterclaims
Supreme Court of Virginia Rule 3:9 was amended effective July
1, 2008, to provide that a counterclaim may timely be filed up to
twenty-one days after the court enters an order ruling on any
demurrer, plea, motion to dismiss, or motion for a bill of particu-
lars, or within such shorter time as the court may prescribe.318
E. Jury Demand
On July 1, 2008, Rule 3:21 was amended to provide that the
court may, "for good cause shown," allow a jury trial where a par-
ty would otherwise have been deemed to have waived trial by jury
for failing to serve and file a demand for a jury trial as provided
in the rule 309
F. Claims for Attorney's Fees
On May 1, 2009, new Supreme Court of Virginia Rule 3:25 was
added, governing a party's request for an award of attorney's
fees.310 The new rule does not apply to requests for attorney's fees
as a sanction under Virginia Code section 8.01-271.1311 or fees in
domestic relations cases.3 12 Under the rule, a party seeking an
306. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 1A:1, Regulations Governing Applications for Admission to the
Virginia Bar Pursuant to the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia (Repl. Vol. 2009).
307. Id.
308. VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:9.
309. VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:21(d).
310. VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:25.
311. VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:25(A).
312. VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:25.
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award of attorney's fees must make a demand for attorney's fees
in the complaint, or in any counterclaim, cross-claim, third-party
claim, or responsive pleading. 31 The demand must identify the
basis for the party's request for attorney's fees.114 Unless the court
allows an amendment of the pleadings under Supreme Court of
Virginia Rule 1:8, the failure of a party to file a demand consti-
tutes a waiver of the claim for attorney's fees.3 15 The court may es-
tablish a procedure for the adjudication of a claim for attorney's
fees.16
G. Discovery
On January 1, 2009, the Supreme Court of Virginia amended
Rules 4:1, 4:4, 4:8, 4:9, and 4:13 to provide for the discovery of
electronically stored information. Rules 4:1(a) and 4:9 now pro-
vide that a party may request the production of electronically
stored information.3 17 Rule 4:4 was amended to state that the par-
ties may enter into stipulations modifying the procedures set
forth in the Rules for discovery of electronically stored informa-
tion.118 Under amended Rule 4:8(f), a party now has the option of
responding to interrogatories by specifying the electronically
stored information from which the answers may be ascertained if
the burden of deriving the responses would be substantially the
same for both parties.3 19 That Rule adds that "[a] specification of
electronically stored information may be made under this Rule if
the information will be made available in a reasonably usable
form or forms."320 Rule 4:9(b)(iii) now provides that, if the request-
ing party does not specify the form for producing electronically
stored information, or if the responding party objects to the form
specified, electronically stored information may be produced in
the form in which it is ordinarily maintained if it is reasonably
usable in that form.321 Rule 4:13 was amended to add to the mat-
ters that may be considered at a pretrial conference "provisions
313. VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:25(B).
314. Id.
315, VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:25(C).
316. VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:25(D).
317. VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:1(a), 4:9(a).
318. VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:4.
319. VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:8(f).
320. Id.
321. VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:9(b)(iii)(B)(2).
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for disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information ''321
and "issues relating to the preservation of potentially discovera-
ble information, including electronically stored information and
information that may be located in sources that are believed not
reasonably accessible because to [sic] undue burden or cost."323
Also effective January 1, 2009, Supreme Court of Virginia Rule
4:1 was amended to establish a procedure following the inadver-
tent disclosure of privileged trial preparation material. 324 Under
new Rule 4: 1(b)(6)(ii), if a party claims that a privileged document
or electronically stored information has been produced, the party
shall notify the receiving party of the claim and the basis for the
assertion of privilege 2 The receiving party, pending a resolution
of the claim of privilege, must then sequester or destroy the ma-
terial and take steps to retrieve the material if it has been disse-
minated to others.3 26 Rule 4:13 was amended to add to the matters
that may be considered at a pretrial conference any agreements
the parties reach concerning inadvertently produced privileged
trial preparation materials 27
On January 1, 2009, former Rule 4:9 was split into two rules:
Rule 4:9 concerning production by parties of documents, electron-
ically stored information and things, and entry on land for inspec-
tion, 28 and new Rule 4:9A, concerning production by non-parties
of documents, electronically stored information and things, and
entry on land for inspection.329
On July 1, 2008, Rule 4:5(al)(iii) was added to specify the pro-
cedures for taking depositions outside of Virginia.33
IV. RECENT LEGISLATION
In 2008, the General Assembly enacted Virginia Code section
8.01-225.02. 3 1 That statute grants immunity to health care pro-
322. VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:13(9).
323. VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:13(8).
324. VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:1(b)(6)(ii).
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:13(10).
328. VA. SUP CT. R. 4:9.
329. VA. SUP CT. R. 4:9A.
330. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:5(al)(iii).
331. Act of Mar. 2, 2008, ch. 157, 2008 Va. Acts 224, 224 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
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viders from liability for personal injury or wrongful death when
the health care provider either delivers or withholds health care
in response to a disaster that has been declared a state or local
emergency and the heath care provider is not able to provide the
standard of care because of a lack of resources attributable to the
disaster.32 The health care provider remains liable for gross neg-
ligence or willful misconduct. 33
Virginia Code section 8.01-241 was amended in 2008 to provide
that a deed of trust or mortgage is enforceable for ten years after
its original maturity, rather than twenty years.3 34 The ten-year
period may be extended by the recordation of a form provided in
Virginia Code section 8.01-241.1. 335 In 2009, the statute was fur-
ther amended to provide for a transition period for deeds of trust
and mortgages whose original maturity dates were between July
1, 1988, and July 1, 2000.336
The statute of limitations for negligent failure to diagnose a
malignant tumor or cancer is, under the 2008 amendment to Vir-
ginia Code section 8.01-243, one year from the date that the diag-
nosis was communicated to the patient, if the failure to diagnose
occurred on or after July 1, 2008.23
A lis pendens may be filed in an action to enforce a zoning vi-
olation under the 2008 amendments to Virginia Code section8.01-268 .138
Under the 2008 modifications to Virginia Code sections 8.01-
271.1, 16.1-260 and 63.2-1901, certain non-lawyer employees of
local departments of social services may sign and file pleadings
related to support in the juvenile and domestic relations district
courts .
Virginia Code section 8.01-417 was amended in 2008 to allow
for the disclosure of the limits of insurance coverage before the fil-
8.01-225.02 (Cum. Supp. 2008)).
332. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-225.02 (Cum. Supp. 2009).
333. See id.
334. Id. § 8.01-241(A) (Cum. Supp. 2009).
335. See id. § 8.01-241(C) (Cum. Supp. 2009).
336. See id. § 8.01-241(B) (Cum. Supp. 2009).
337. See id. § 8.01-243(C)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2009).
338. See id. § 8.01-268(A) (Cum. Supp. 2009).
339. Id. § 8.01-271 (Cum. Supp. 2009), id. § 16.1-260 (Cum. Supp. 2009); id. § 63.2-1901
(Cum. Supp. 2009).
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ing of a personal injury lawsuit arising from a motor vehicle acci-
dent.4° An attorney or a pro se party may request that the insurer
disclose the coverage limits.3 41 The requesting party shall provide
the insurer with the date of the accident, the name and last
known address of the insured, any accident report, his or her
medical records, and medical bills and documentation of lost wag-
es.3 42 If the lost wages and medical bills exceed $12,500, the in-
surer shall disclose the limits of coverage within thirty days. 311
In the Medical Malpractice Act, the definition of "health care"
was expanded in 2008 to include "professional services in nursing
homes."34 4 This amendment was apparently a legislative response
to the case of Alcoy v. Valley Nursing Homes, Inc., which held
that nursing home services are not subject to the Medical Mal-
practice Act.
In 2009, the General Assembly adopted the Uniform Interstate
Depositions and Discovery Act.34 6 The new act replaces the now-
repealed Uniform Foreign Depositions Act. 47
340. Act of Apr. 11, 1008, ch. 819, 2008 Va. Acts 1434, 1435 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-417(C) (Cum. Supp. 2009).
341. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-417(C) (Cum. Supp. 2009).
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Act of Mar. 3, 2008, ch. 169, 2008 Va. Acts 244, 245 (codified as amended VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.1 (Cum. Supp. 2009)).
345. 272 Va. 37, 43-44, 630 S.E.2d 301, 304 (2006).
346. Act of Mar. 30, 2009, ch. 701, 2009 Va. Acts _ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§
8.01-412.8 through 8.01-412.15 (Cum. Supp. 2009)).
347. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-411, 8.01-412, 8.01-412.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007) (repealed 2009).
20091

